Since it was passed, the Clarity Act has been at the core of any secessionist debate in Canada and abroad. Although contested at home, the Clarity Act has earned worldwide prestige as the democratic standard that must be observed when a secessionist debate arises.
Introduction
Constitutional interpretation is not an easy task, and particularly so when courts have to deal with what Dworkin refers to as hard cases.
I In these situations, when the choice of norm to apply is not clear, or when there are legal vacuums, resorting to foreign experiences can shed some light on the issue and help legal operators to solve the case.
Facing a secessionist challenge that puts into question the unity of the state is, without any doubt, one of the hardest cases on which a Court might have to decide. Most
Constitutions are silent on the matter, while some include clauses that declare the indissoluble character of the nation and the indivisibility of the territory. II Therefore, the lack of positive legal materials to inform Court's decisions poses a big challenge that might be solved by referring to the practical wisdom of foreign judgments (Choudhry 2006: 4) .
Although Chouhdry focuses his approach on judges and tribunals, the migration of constitutional ideas also has an impact in the political arena. This migration might not just be between courts, but also from one Parliament to another. Secession is a complex matter that in its own intrinsic nature combines both the legal and the political (Mancini 2012: 483-487); III hence, any answer to this problem has to include both elements.
Since the restoration of democracy in 1978, Spain has experienced several secessionist claims, with those coming from the Basque Country and Catalonia having a higher degree of intensity. The Spanish constitutional framework does not contemplate the possibility of holding a referendum to address such claims. This possibility has been rejected by the Constitutional Court according to article 2 of the Spanish Constitution, which affirms that sovereignty resides with the Spanish people and, as a consequence, not with the Autonomous Communities.
IV
Regardless of this theoretical consideration about the indivisibility of sovereignty, some political actors have turned their attention to the Canadian experience in order to find a legal framework to address these secessionist claims. After the narrow victory of the 'NO' camp in the 1995 referendum, the Canadian federal government decided that it was time to clarify the ground rules governing secession. Following the Reference Re Secession of Quebec, V the Clarity Act was passed in 2000 with the aim of resolving some of the uncertainties created by the Supreme Court Reference.
The Clarity Act in the Canadian constitutional system: a matter of dispute
In 1995 the unity of the Canadian federation was in question. The referendum on sovereignty was the epilogue of a period of tensions -a "constitutional odyssey" in Russell´s words-between Quebec and the federal government that started in 1982 with the patriation of the Constitution without the consent of Quebec´s National Assembly and continued with the failure of the constitutional rounds of Lake Meech (1987) and Charlottetown (1992) . VIII The 'NO' camp won by a margin of less than 55,000 votes (about 1.1% of the electorate), with the highest turnout to date in the history of the province of 93.52%.
This near-death experience led the federal government to refer the matter of the unilateral secession of Quebec to the Supreme Court. After years of constitutional disillusionment, the Supreme Court was called to settle the issue and decide if Quebec had a right to secede under domestic or international law. IX In its reference the Supreme Court enlarged on the Constitution, which was described as a living tree, X by identifying a series of unwritten rules that include, "the global system of rules and principles which govern the exercise of constitutional authority in every part of the Canadian state". XI E -137 highlighted four fundamental principles: federalism, democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of law and respect for minorities. These principles work in symbiosis, meaning that none of them can trump or exclude the others.
XII
The operation of these overlapping principles allowed the Court to conclude that Quebec had no right to unilaterally secede from Canada under domestic or international law.
XIII Nevertheless, the interaction of the same principles generated a duty to negotiate in good faith in the event of a clear expression of will of the people of Quebec that can only be derived from a clear majority on a clear question as a result of a qualitative evaluation.
XIV
As Tierney (2004: 263) notes, the Court´s conception of the term "unilateral" was very narrow, being understood as secession without prior negotiations. This consideration, together with the principles of federalism and democracy, resulted in the creation of an obligation to negotiate in good faith the practicalities of secession, as the rest of Canada could not refuse to enter these negotiations after a clear expression of the desire to pursue secession from the population of a province.
XV
With the intention of giving legal entrenchment to the Secession Reference, the federal government introduced the Clarity Act. XVI According to Stéphane Dion, the Crown
Minister responsible for the act, the bill was needed because the government of Quebec had refused to commit itself to the Court´s opinion (Dion 2000: 21) . In Dion´s view, the interpretation of the Secession Reference made by the Parti Québécois (PQ) was incomplete. It merely focused on the obligation to negotiate, disregarding the notions of a clear majority and a clear question. The preamble of the bill stated that its purpose was to clarify the circumstances under which the government of Canada would enter into negotiations after a provincial referendum on secession. For that reason, the Clarity Act set the rules that must be observed before the federal government enters into any kind of negotiations with a province that wants to secede. In respect of the majority needed in any referendum, the Clarity Act established that the House of Commons should take into account the size of the majority of valid votes cast in favour of the secessionist option, the percentage of eligible voters voting in the referendum and any other matters or circumstances it considered relevant. The Clarity Act did not establish any threshold or minimum level of support required to consider that the result constituted a clear expression of the will to secede. The Court left the issue of the clarity of the majority for the political actors to determine, but it made two important remarks that need to be highlighted. The first one is that the clear majority has to come from a qualitative evaluation; XX the second was that democracy, and the Canadian constitutional system, are more than simple majority rule. XXI From these two premises it can be inferred that a simple majority could not be considered to constitute a clear majority, and that other factors such as the total number of voters or the territorial distribution of votes also need to be taken into account.
As mentioned above, there have been competing interpretations of the opinion of the Court in the Secession Reference between federal and provincial governments (Dumberry 2015: 370-379) . In response to the Clarity Act -which made it almost impossible to achieve secession under Canadian law (Pelletier 2001: 526-527 (2000: 4-5) recalls that there seemed to be a feeling among Quebeckers that a clear majority was needed to be able to proceed with secession.
As we can see, some provisions of Bill 99 directly conflict with the regulation made by the federal government in the Clarity Act. Although this controversy was referred to the courts years ago, thus far no ruling has been issued. XXIII To date, a third referendum is not on the agenda, as the PQ has committed itself not to hold one if they return to power as the winning conditions are far from being a reality. 
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In Spain, admiration for the Clarity Act is widespread among the left of center and nationalist political parties as a standard that must be met in order to classify a constitutional system as democratic. The mantra of a "clear majority on a clear question" has been repeated for years without further explanation of what it really means or how would it be implemented in Spain. For its supporters, no true democrat could be opposed to the Clarity Act, as this instrument is the only viable tool to know the true will of the people on the question of secession. Hence, this Act results in a test of maturity for any system that defines itself as democratic.
This simplistic approach contains a reductionism of the Secession Reference to the obligation to negotiate, following the example of Quebec´s sovereigntists. The Spanish nationalist forces have identified those notions of the Canadian experience that are most favorable for their cause, presenting them as the "Canadian parameter". The first one implies that it is possible and legitimate for a territorial subunit to conduct a referendum on secession. In Spain, referendums can only be called with the approval of the President, following article 92 of the Spanish Constitution. This legal difference between the two constitutional systems, together with the absence of a constitutional clause concerning the unity of the Canadian state, have been underestimated by some of the advocates of the Canadian experience. The second notion that has been highlighted by some of the advocates of this model is the duty to negotiate discussed above.
As López Basguren (2005: 12-14) remarks, these forces have consciously ignored important parts of the Canadian reality, creating their own vision and presenting it as if it were the Canadian model. This political discourse has benefited from the inaction of other political actors as, surprisingly, political parties opposing secession did not challenge this interpretation of the Canadian experience until some years ago. These parties left the monopoly of the "Canadian parameter" to the nationalist forces, which took advantage of this to create their own Canadian narrative.
As has been said above, the level of admiration for the Clarity Act varies across the political spectrum. In general terms, it is higher among parties that consider themselves to be to the left of center. These political formations have tried to find a balance between the principles of democracy and legality that could result in the recognition of the possibility of holding a referendum on secession within the current constitutional framework. Parties from the center to the right usually prioritize the principle of legality, stating that there E -141 cannot be democracy without respect for the rule of law and the constitutional order.
Among nationalist parties the interest in the Clarity Act is also high, but with a different perspective. These formations, especially those in Catalonia, tend to emphasize the value of democracy, as the centerpiece of their political discourse. They have created the term "derecho a decidir" (right to decide) that basically hides within it a right to self-determination (López Basaguren 2016: 166-171) . In their view, the democratic principle must prevail over others, as there is no bigger power that the will of the people expressed in a referendum.
This conception entails a notion of hierarchy among constitutional principles, democracy being a value superior to the others, an aspect that was expressly rejected in the Canadian Supreme Court Reference.
XXVIII
In the first group, we find the traditional position of the PSC (Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya), the sister party of the Socialists (PSOE) in the Autonomous Community of Catalonia. For this formation, the Clarity Act is a federalist tool that can be used to address secessionist claims. The PSC defends a federal reform of the Spanish Constitution, a Clarity Act being an alternative in the event of that reform failing (Pascual 2016a). For the leader of the PSC, Miquel Iceta, the Canadian Clarity Act lacks clarity, as it does not specify which question and majority must be considered as clear (Pascual 2016b) . In his view, a Clarity Act has the virtue of encouraging agreements between the parties in conflict making secession less likely due to the requirement of a reinforced majority on a clear question.
Although these postulates have been defended for years by the PSC, they have been abandoned in the last months as they created major tensions with the PSOE.
XXIX The importation of the Clarity Act would mean the acceptance of the possibility of holding a referendum on secession, an aspect that is rejected by the majority of the PSOE. The question that thus arises is the following: why is qualitative analysis absent for the much praised "Canadian parameter" in the Spanish debate? In my view, the answer lies in the fact that this analysis could become a counter argument for those in favor of secession.
To take qualitative elements into consideration, we have to take a closer look to aspects such as the distribution of support of the secessionist cause across the territory, the presence of minority groups or the degree of turnout in the event of a referendum. These three aspects tend to perform a role that does not play in favour of the secessionist Another point that is often misunderstood is the obligation to negotiate. In Spain, this duty tends to be characterized, particularly by those in favor of the derecho a decidir, as an obligation for the rest of the state to allow the subunit to secede. Hence, for these actors, the negotiation should be about the details of secession and not about secession itself, an aspect that they take for granted. This interpretation clearly contradicts the opinion of the Supreme Court in the Secession Reference. For the Court, the conduct of the parties in the negotiation process should be governed by the same principles that gave rise to the duty to negotiate. XXXVIII Those principles imply a rejection of the proposition that there is a legal obligation to accede to secession, as this would mean that the subunit would dictate the terms of the proposed secession, thereby nullifying the process of negotiation. XXXIX At the same time, the federal government could neither refuse to enter into negotiations, nor conduct them in such a way that would suppose a complete denial of Quebec´s rights, as this would give some legitimacy to the demands for a unilateral process. Therefore, the Supreme Court created a duty to negotiate in good faith, excluding the extreme positions of both parties, although this duty might indeed result in the secession of the territorial subunit.
In Spain, there seems to be a high degree of confusion between the obligation related to the means, the negotiation process as created by the Supreme Court, and an obligation related to the objective, which is the one desired by Quebec´s sovereigntists. The negotiation process is not about the logistics of secession, as is commonly understood in
Spain, but about the whole issue of secession. The content of the agreement that would result from these negotiations, or even the failure to reach one, is an issue for both parties Returning to the Clarity Act and its impact on secessionist processes, it should be recalled that the biggest virtue of the act is that it establishes a set of rules to address a referendum on secession. These rules should have an impact on the body that wants to 
Catalonia and the 9N consultation
Recourse to the Canadian process as a factor of legitimacy has also been a feature in Catalonia. In this region, the political struggle tends to be about the possibility of holding a referendum on secession. In this context, the "Canadian parameter" is presented as a model of democracy. For those who share this view, the 1980 and 1995 referendums in Quebec are examples of the true democratic nature of the Canadian constitutional system, as it allowed the consultation of the Quebec electorate on the issue of sovereignty.
Following this reasoning, the rejection by the central government of the possibility of holding a referendum shows a lack of democratic culture that legitimatizes the recourse to unilateralism.
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In 2014, the Catalan government called for a referendum on the political future of Catalonia. As it was declared unlawful by the Spanish Constitutional Court, the Catalan government -with the aid of thousands of volunteers-conducted a participatory process designed to be like a referendum. This participatory process took place on November 9 2014 and consisted of a double question in which the second part was subordinated to the answer given in the first one. Those questions were originally designed for the referendum that was suspended by the Constitutional Court, but were carried over into the participatory process. These were: 
a) Do you want Catalonia to become a State? (Yes or No) If the answer is in the affirmative: b) Do you want this State to be independent? (Yes or No)

Migration and its limits: lessons from the Canadian experience
The two examples discussed above are illustrations of how, in Spain, the Canadian reality has been distorted in order to serve the interests of certain political parties. The
Canadian experience is a compact that contains several elements that cannot be separated from each other. The selective use of some of those elements, while ignoring the others, has been common in Spain for some time.
The Canadian experience offers plenty of lessons that could be useful to address the secessionist claims that Spain is currently experiencing, but they need to be put in context within the constitutional reality. In my view, becoming obsessed with importing foreign ideas to solve domestic problems is a mistake. Canada is a good comparative case to study how other countries have reacted to secessionist tensions in their own territory, but the Canadian model cannot be separated from the Canadian constitutional framework. The foundations of some of the elements of the Canadian experience that have been frequently quoted by the Basque and Catalan nationalists reside in the constitutional structure of the Canadian system, which is very different from the one present in Spain.
First of all, Canada is a federal entity while Spain, although it presents some federal elements, is a decentralized state where the subunits are not sovereign bodies. XLIX One of the myths that are often cited by those in favor of the derecho a decidir is that the Canadian government agreed to the referendums in Quebec. If we take a closer look at the Canadian Constitution we will see that the power to conduct referendums is absent. The establishment of these conditions also had an influence on the secessionist camp, as the legitimacy of their cause was subordinated to the achievement of these conditions.
Otherwise, the process would be considered as unlawful and the international recognition of the state would be compromised due to the unilateral nature of the process of secession.
The Canadian model is useful as a comparative example, but it has to be taken as a compact in order to be able to learn from the experience. Focusing on just one aspect, or making biased interpretations as some politicians do in Spain, is a mistake. Contrary to the general perception in Spain, the Canadian experience has more to offer to the federalist cause that to those pushing for secession. It underlines some of the weaknesses of the secessionist strategy, especially when it is confronted with a clear legal framework to respond to a secessionist challenge.
In 1980 Since the Clarity Act, secessionists must abide by the procedure established in that act; otherwise the federal government will refuse to enter into negotiations on secession (Dion 2014: 34-36).
Concluding remarks
Once the impact of the Clarity Act on the Spanish political system has been assessed, a As has been said above, the concept of a clear majority is the one that has had the greatest impact upon the Spanish political landscape. An ambiguous formulation like the one in the Clarity Act is unlikely in Spain, as most actors have expressed their preference for a complete regulation of the issue. An illustration of this, although it was not an enlarged majority, is the aforementioned provision of the project of Statute of the Basque Country regarding a referendum on its political relationship with Spain.
Setting the minimum required percentage in favour before a referendum could help to evaluate if its result is clear or not, as there would be clear rules to decide what would constitute a clear majority. But this presetting of a clear majority entails the risk of subordinating the whole process to this issue, thereby conditioning the final result. As much as the wording of the question can influence the electorate, the presetting of a majority threshold can do so as well. If the achievement of that enlarged majority seems unlikely some voters could be tempted to vote for that option in the hope that it would translate into a higher degree of autonomy. Also, this factor could exacerbate secessionist tensions with the intention of mobilizing the electorate in order to achieve the required level of support. As a consequence, this could make secession more likely.
The duty to negotiate is also an important value that should be taken into account.
Negotiations are an essential element of politics, and any effort to address a threat of secession must involve such a process. Contrary to the conceptualisation that those in E -153 favour of secession tend to make, this duty does not comprise an obligation to negotiate the details of secession, but an obligation to negotiate the whole issue that might, or might not, lead to secession. If we take it in broader terms, this value enshrines an obligation to address the problem of secession, an obligation to recognise that there is a part of the population that is discontent with the political arrangement currently in place, and that desires a change. This negotiation could result in the amendment of the Constitution in order to accommodate certain national or regional sensibilities. In this sense, the duty to negotiate could be seen as a test of the maturity of any democratic system, which has to adapt to address certain challenges even if those put into question the constitutional framework in place. This conception of the duty to negotiate is useful, even for those political forces that are opposed to secession, and that often do not pay much attention to the Canadian model. As said before, the Canadian experience contains more lessons against the secessionist cause than in favor, but they have been silenced due to the lack of interest of these political actors.
All things considered, it would be good for Spain to develop its own framework to respond to secessionist challenges, instead of copying the Canadian experience. Even though transplanting the Clarity Act does not seem a good choice, its inherent notions are a good starting point, but they need to be adapted to the constitutional architecture of the Spain. Enacting a legal framework to address secessionist claims will help to reduce tensions between both levels of government, delegitimising the recourse to a unilateral path to secession. It will also enhance cooperation between governments, as the political agenda would not be focused only on secession.
The aforementioned values of the Canadian experience have helped to decrease the uncertainties and ambiguities of the process and could be useful in the drafting of a Spanish model. Furthermore, by articulating its own legal framework Spain could implement elements such as a cooling down clause that are not present in the Canadian experience.
LVII This clause would prevent the neverendum dynamic that was mentioned before. Other elements like the requirement of a higher quorum than for ordinary constitutional amendment or sub-territorial ratification could also be considered. 
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there is a bigger picture. If Spanish institutions want to redirect the situation and reduce support for sovereignty in Catalonia, they must address other issues such as the distribution of competences, the distribution of finances, and an acknowledgment of national sensibilities in the Constitution. Secession is a hard case, and there are no easy ways to resolve it. Bold actions and a comprehensive legal framework are good tools to begin with but their utility is doubtful if there is no political will to find a compromise. Dworkin (1975 Dworkin ( ) & (1978 : 81. For Dworkin, hard cases are those that are not easy to solve for the judge because they cannot be resolved by the use of an unequivocal legal rule, set out by the appropriate body prior to the event. In these cases, principles play a crucial role in order to help the judge to settle the case. The issue of secession constitutes a hard case as there is no rule, unequivocal or not, to decide the case. Because of this, the Canadian Supreme Court recurred to the implicit principles that underlie the Constitution to establish a mechanism to address the secessionist demands of part of the Quebec population. II The indivisible character of the state is present in the constitutions of France (articles 1 and 89), Italy (article 5), Brazil (article 1), Mexico (article 2) or Norway (article 1). Even a state born out of secession like Kosovo defines itself as indivisible according to article 1.1 of its constitution. In this sense, we can also recall a passage of the United States Supreme Court in Texas v White US 700, 725 (1869) affirming that "the Constitution […] looks to an indestructible union, composed of indestructible states". III As Mancini (2012: 481) notes, secession is at once the most revolutionary and the most institutionally conservative of political constructs. This duality reflects the complexity of this phenomenon as it could constitute a great challenge to state sovereignty, but it also can be an incentive to reinforce the latter in order to avoid the dismemberment of the state. IV The Spanish Constitutional Court ruled in the STC 42/2014 that "la Constitución atribuye con carácter exclusivo la titularidad de la soberanía nacional al pueblo español" [The Constitution exclusively attributes the ownership of national sovereignty to the Spanish people], rejecting the consideration of the Catalonian people as sovereign as it constitutes only a fraction of the Spanish people. V Reference Re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 SCR 217, hereafter Secession Reference. VI The Parti Québécois and the Bloc Québécoishave openly criticized the act since its passing. In 2013 the BQ filed a motion to repeal it, but it was rejected by 283 to 5 in the House of Commons. Scholars like Pérez Tremps (2004: 53-55) , Taillon (2014: 13-59) , Rocher and Verrelli (2003: 220-232) and Haljan (2014: 379-380) have also stressed the ambiguities of the Clarity Act. VII Several political parties have expressed their support to the idea of importing the Clarity Act. This is the case, among others, of the PNV (Congreso de los Diputados 2014: 40), the PSC (2016a: 9) or JxSí, the collation between CiU and ERC, (Hernàndez and Tomàs 2016) . VIII Russell characterizes as a constitutional odyssey the quest to bring the Constitution home from the United Kingdom -patriation-and the subsequent efforts to integrate Quebec back in the constitutional consensus after it was left out in 1982. For an overview of this period vid. Russell (2004 : 107-227), Oliver (2005 and Stein (1997: 307-338) . IX The questions raised were: 1) Under the Constitution of Canada, can the National Assembly, legislature or government of Quebec effect the secession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally? 2) Does international law give the National Assembly, legislature, or government of Quebec the right to effect the secession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally? In this regard, is there a right to self-determination under international law that would give the National Assembly, legislature, or government of Quebec the right to effect the secession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally? 3) In the event of a conflict between domestic and international law on the right of the National Assembly, legislature, or government of Quebec to effect the secession of Quebec from XIII The Court concluded that Quebec was outside of the scope of the situations where international law grants a right to external self-determination, as it was not a colony, its people were not oppressed and were not denied a meaningful access to government to pursue their political, economic, social and cultural development (Secession Reference para 138). For a detailed analysis see Woehrling (1999: 405-436) . XIV Secession Reference para 87. XV Secession Reference para 88. XVI "An Act to give effect to the requirement for clarity as set out in the opinion of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Quebec Secession" Reference S.C. 2000, c. 26. XVII Secession Reference paras 87-92. XVIII Following section 1(4) of the Clarity Act these are: (a) a referendum question that merely focuses on a mandate to negotiate without soliciting a direct expression of the will of the population of that province on whether the province should cease to be part of Canada; or (b) a referendum question that envisages other possibilities in addition to the secession of the province from Canada, such as economic or political arrangements with Canada, that obscure a direct expression of the will of the population of that province on whether the province should cease to be part of Canada. XIX Although the Secession Reference does not contain a prohibition of asking about future arrangements, the notion of a clear expression of will seems to be in conflict with subordinating the answer to a future event that could or could not happen. XX Secession Reference para 87. XXI Secession Reference paras 73-76. XXII "An Act respecting the exercise of the fundamental rights and prerogatives of the Québec people and the Québec State", (2000, chapter 46). XXIII The judicial process started in 2001 when Keith Henderson, the leader of the Equality Party, impugned six articles of the Bill 99. Due to administrative problems the process was delayed for several years. In 2013 the government of Quebec and the federal government intervened to express their respective positions on the matter. Again, for administrative reasons, the ruling has been delayed and it should be rendered in 2018. XXIV This policy was initiated by Lucien Bouchard when he became PM of Quebec in 1996, who affirmed that he would not call another referendum until the winning conditions -conditions gagnantes-were met, in other words, until the support for sovereignty was high enough to guarantee a victory of the secessionist option (Globe and Mail: 1999) . The recently elected leader of the PQ, Jean-François Lisée, has also committed himself to this idea (Radio Canada: 2016) . XXV Related to this topic vid. Relaño Pastor (1999: 63-86) , Oliveras i Jané (2001: 243-279) and Ruiz Vieytez (2006: 9-29 XLIII The original text, in Spanish, was "el compromiso de no ejercer unilateralmente el derecho de autodeterminación y el reconocimiento explícito de la obligación de abrir un proceso de negociación y pacto con el Estado". XLIV The Basque government envisaged the Basque Country as a free state associated to Spain, in similar fashion to the sovereignty-association proposed by the Parti Québécois in 1980, and the new economic and political partnership in 1995. XLV This plan was articulated through Law 9/2008, which contained provisions for a non-binding referendum to ask for a mandate to negotiate with the terrorist group ETA, and to conduct negotiations to design a new legal framework for the derecho a decidir. The preamble of the law made explicit references to the Secession Reference as a factor of legitimacy. As the referendum had an impact on sovereignty it was rejected by the Constitutional Court as it was a matter for the whole Spanish nation to decide on, not just a fraction of it. XLVI As the questions were originally designed for the referendum, they were included in the Decree 129/2014 of the Generalitat of Catalonia that was enacted under the provisions of the Law 10/2014. The Constitutional Court suspended both norms after they were challenged by the Central Government. Following the ruling of the Constitutional Court the Catalan Government decided to carry on the participatory process with the same questions designed for the referendum. XLVII It should be noted that any change in the Spanish Constitutional framework regarding the territorial organization of the state must obtain the approval of the Spanish people in a referendum. XLVIII The census was elaborated on a case-by-case basis with data of the electors that voted. Some organizations opposed to the secession process claimed that there cases of fraud due to this issue. XLIX The federal nature of Canada was contested by Wheare (1963: 19-20) , who described the Canadian constitution as quasi-federal, although he conceded that it was predominantly federal in practice. This statement is based on a literal reading of the Constitution, in particular those provisions regarding the power of disallowance and the federal appointment of lieutenant governors which conferred powers to the federal government that could undermine the authority of the provinces. However, this idea was rejected by the Supreme Court in the Secession Reference (para 55) highlighting the undisputed federal nature of Canada given the fact that these powers has been abandoned. This idea is shared by Hogg (2007: 5-19) and Monahan (2013: 84-85) . In relation to Spain, it has been described by Watts (2009: 55) and Moreno (2007: 95-97) as "a federation in disguise" because of the federalizing nature of the internal logic of the Estado de las Autonomías. L Quebec enacted its Referendum Act, chapter 64.1, in 1978 under the provincial residual clause regarding matters of merely local or private nature in the province of section 92.16 C. 1867. LI Secession Reference para 84. LII Conference at the Barcelona Bar on April 11th 2013 entitled "Secession and Democracy". LIII In fact, in addition to the Canadian case, just two constitutions in the world, Ethiopia (article 39.1) and Saint Kits and Nevis (article 115), contain provisions regulating the right to secession. LIV In relation with the metaphor, vid. Ewald (1995): 489-51, Nelken and Feest (2001) and Pegoraro (2013): 33-80. LV The Government of Catalonia requested the transfer of this competence in 2014 through proposition 125/000013, but it was rejected by the Spanish Parliament. It must be noted that in its ruling 103/2008 the Constitutional Court considered that holding a referendum on secession is against the Constitution as the sovereignty belongs to the nation. Any consultation in that sense needs a previous reform of the Constitution in order to be compatible with it. LVI As Aláez Corral (2015) : 151-157 recalls, there are not any material limits on the Spanish Constitution and, therefore, its complete amendment is possible. For that reason, this article should not be considered as an impediment to include a secession clause in the Spanish Constitution. LVII A cooling down -enfriamiento in the Spanish doctrine-clause refers to the entrenchment of a clause that bans the holding of a new referendum on secession for a period of time after one has been held with the aim of preventing a dynamic of continues referendums on the issue. This clause settles the debate for a period, allowing the electorate to reflect of the issue without the passions of the political debate. LVIII See Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forest), 2004 SCC 73. This territorial counting of the votes could be a tool to address the issue of different degrees of support for secession among the territory of a given Autonomous Community. The requirement of an enlarged majority would not just apply to the final result, but also to the result in each province that integrates the Autonomous Community that wants to secede. These elements have a qualitative nature in line with the reasoning of the Canadian Supreme Court. This instrument could also be used to protect minorities that are not concentrated in a sub-unit, like those resulting from immigration. In this sense, vid. Saénz Royo (2016: 145-148) .
